By Ong Kian Ming | TMI
What happens in the unlikely event that Pakatan Rakyat (PR) wins and
maintains control of the federal government after the 13th general
election? This is a question which few people have tried to address
systematically. In this article, I want to highlight what I think will
be the five main challenges facing a PR federal government as a way to
contextualise the policy options which such a government will have to
address.
I have summarised these five main challenges into five “P”s: (i)
Dealing with the “Past” (ii) Distributing “Power” between the federal
and state governments (iii) Coming up with a new set of “Plans” in the
economic, political and social arenas (iv) Focusing on a smaller number
of “Priorities” which can be delivered within 100 days and one year and
finally (v) Finding a set of “Procedures” to deal with disagreements
within the PR coalition.
(i) Past
Having been in power for 55 years, there are bound to be a whole list
of “legacy” issues which a new government has to figure out how to deal
with. It would not be practical for a new federal government to conduct
a massive witch hunt to weed out all those who have paid bribes to the
previous government to obtain contracts, to find evidence to convict all
BN politicians who have received bribes or have amassed wealth beyond
their means or to sack all civil servants who have been complicit in
corrupt dealings involving the previous government. But at the same
time, it makes sense for a PR government to outline a clear set of rules
with regard to how it will, for example, deal with dubious contracts
which the government has signed with private companies. This is
important because there is a great temptation for PR to blame the
previous BN government for many of the problems that it will face when
it is governing. Instead of blaming BN in an ad-hoc manner throughout
its first term in government, it would be better for PR to outline a
place to clear out the skeletons in the cupboard early in its tenure in
power.
PR has already given some indication as to the contracts it will
attempt to cancel or renegotiate when it comes to power, namely the
contracts with toll operators and independent power producers. There are
bound to be many other smaller contracts which are potentially
disadvantageous to the government which could be renegotiated or
cancelled. The criteria for contract renegotiation or cancellation need
to be spelled out as soon as possible as a way of assuring the markets
and the many companies which have large contracts with the government.
Similarly, PR needs to figure out the extent to which it wants to
change the government procurements process. It will be a tricky
balancing act since many of the current contractors have well
established relationships with Umno who are also Malay entrepreneurs who
will question PR’s commitment to protecting Malay entrepreneurship if
they are cut off from these government contracts. At the same time, this
also presents an opportunity to introduce open tender processes that
could potentially save the government billions of ringgit in
expenditure.
More than important than mere contracts is the fate of those who
wrongly benefited from the awarding of these contracts and other
government-related concessions and favours. To what extent will a PR
government go after the likes of Tajudin Ramli, those involved in PKFZ,
NFC and Scorpene submarine scandals? Will a PR government try to recover
as much revenue as possible and will it try to convict the individuals
involved in these scandals as well?
Similar questions surround the fate of BN politicians who may have
amassed ill-gotten gains through their government positions. Will PR go
after the ill-gotten gains of the individuals in question or will it
also go after the individuals in question? Is there a cut-off mark under
which some cases may not be investigated?
Here, it may be useful to establish an equivalent of the Truth and
Reconciliation Committee established in South Africa after the
abolishment of apartheid. In exchange for amnesty, politicians, civil
servants and even businessmen who have amassed ill-gotten gains can use
this platform to “confess” their past wrongdoing and return a percentage
of their wealth to the taxpayer. Similar actions can be taken by
individuals who want to blow the whistle on themselves and admit to past
wrongdoing, not just in terms of financial gain but also in terms of
other past abuses of power including granting citizenship to foreigners
to allow them to vote, wrongfully jailing innocent victims, beating up
public protestors, just to name a few.
This may be a cathartic experience for the nation for past mistakes
to be revealed and for the nation to move on and firmly establish itself
as a democratic nation with regular alternations in power. Question is,
will a PR government subject itself to the same levels of scrutiny,
including admission of past mistakes among those in PR who were formerly
high ranking politicians in the BN government?
(ii) Power
The second major challenge to a PR government is in the re-allocation
of power between the federal government and the states. Right now, the
PR state governments in Kelantan, Kedah, Penang and Selangor say that
their hands are tied because of the lack of funding and co-operation
from the federal government on key issues including the consolidation of
water assets and pricing, the consolidation of wage management, the
responsibility for public transportation and road maintenance and the
proper allocation of federal funding including the oil royalties paid to
Kelantan, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak.
With a PR government at the federal level, such excuses will no
longer be valid. A PR federal government will have to pick the low
hanging fruit in terms of distributing power and funds back to the
states in areas which are clearly defined to be under state
jurisdiction. This may not be as easy as it sounds. Even increasing the
oil royalty from 5 per cent to 20 per cent will entail a redistribution
of as much as RM10 billion from the federal government to the states.
Hard decisions will have to be made with regard to where some of these
cuts have to be made at the federal level.
Other issues concerning decentralisation of power from the federal to
the state governments, a cornerstone of PR’s promises both in the Buku
Jingga (Orange Book) and more recently in the Tawaran Jingga (Orange
Offer), will require achieving an internal consensus within PR. The DAP
will want to push for the restoration of local council elections,
something which PAS and PKR seem lukewarm about. PAS will want to push
for the implementation of hudud, especially in the states which it
controls, especially Kelantan. Needless to say, the DAP will object to
this vehemently.
A PR federal government would also be under some pressure to apply
some of these decentralisation measures consistently among the states,
including those governed by the BN. For example, it would be
inconsistent for the BN to give an increased share of oil royalties to
Kelantan but not to the (likely) BN governed states of Terengganu,
Sarawak and Sabah. Nor would it be consistent for PR to promise to pass
this money back to these states on the condition that voters in these
states vote in PR state governments.
It actually makes long-term sense for a PR federal government to
decentralise as much as is economically and politically plausible as an
insurance policy in the likelihood that it loses control of the federal
government in the future. Having greater democracy and decentralised
power means that the states and local authorities which PR still
controls can have more independence and, hopefully, be more effective as
well.
(iii) Plans
While one can question their effectiveness, there is less doubt that
Prime Minister Najib Razak has put in place a comprehensive
transformation plans to address various shortcomings in the political,
economic and social arenas. Most politically aware Malaysians are
already familiar with the alphabet soup which is associated with Najib’s
transformation programmes — 1 Malaysia, ETP, GTP, NEM, PTP — even if
they are unsure about the achievements of these programmes.
PR is not likely to follow in Najib’s footsteps in designing a
similar “transformation” programme but it will still need to come up
with concrete and well thought out plans of its own in order to shape
the country’s political, economic and social agenda according to the
vision and philosophy of PR and its leaders.
PR is better placed in some areas to deliver substantive positive
change compared to the BN. It would be relatively easy for PR to deliver
on promises of reform in terms of political rights and civil liberties
by abolishing any laws which allow for detention without trial such as
the Security Offences Special Measures Act (SOSMA), abolish the need to
have a permit to print a newspaper and to allow political parties to
have a presence in university campuses, just to name a few. But PR would
also have to resist the temptation of using their power in order to
intimidate and threaten the mainstream media newspapers and television
which are owned or closely associated with BN parties. Similarly, it
also needs to resist the temptation of using RTM1 and 2 as a government
mouthpiece.
PR can also deliver significant institutional reform such as making
the Election Commission (EC) and the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission (MACC) independent and allowing them to carry out their jobs
without political interference. It would also have to tackle the tricky
task of reforming the police force including finding new roles for
existing Special Branch officers, assuming that their services will no
longer be needed or needed less often. It is also needs to strengthen
the civil service’s resolve to be professional and accountable rather
than to force it to change its political allegiance from BN to PR.
In terms of the economy, PR will have to find new sources of economic
growth as well as enhance current sources of growth. Some of this can
be realised by the freeing up of certain monopolies so that competitive
forces can be released in currently protected sectors. Other initiatives
require a longer time period to come to fruition such as increasing the
innovation and R&D capacity in the country. One way in which this
process can be expedited is to tap on the large Malaysian disapora, some
of whom may be interested to come back and invest their time, expertise
and money under a new non-BN federal government.
One of the biggest policy areas for PR to tackle would be in
education since this is something which almost all Malaysians care about
and where there is a widespread consensus that something drastic needs
to be done in order to arrest the decline in the standard of public
education in the country. PR has said that it would respect the rights
of vernacular (Mandarin and Tamil) and religious schools to flourish in
the country. It will have its hands full in taking on the civil service
as well as some within the PR who do not want to strengthen vernacular
and religious education, especially in allowing more Chinese primary and
independent secondary schools to be established.
These are only a few of the key policy questions which PR has to
address if it comes to power at the federal level. The list can easily
be longer. PR’s challenge is to design a strategic plan or plans in
order to fulfil a set of political, economic and social goals.
(iv) Priorities
Not all of the plans outlined in Part (iii) can be fulfilled in a
short period of time. Some may even take more than one term to deliver
the desired results. PR does not have the luxury of taking its time to
deliver once it is in control of the federal government. It needs to
prioritise its various objectives so that some immediate quick wins can
be given the proper focus. Some of PR’s promises in its first 100 days
in government have already been outlined in the Buku Jingga such as
setting up an RCI on the problem of illegal immigrants in Sabah,
providing free wifi to the rural areas in the country and abolishing
certain corporate subsidies such as the gas subsidy to the independent
power producers (IPPs). These deliverables may have to be adjusted if a
PR federal government realises that some of the initiatives may take
longer than 100 days to fulfil.
It is important for PR to show it can deliver concrete results and
initiatives early in its administration so that it can build momentum
for other initiatives later on. Without clear, focused priorities, PR
may fall into the trap of wanting to do too much but failing to deliver
anything significant in a timely manner.
(v) Procedures
Finally, PR will have to come up with certain procedures, both formal
and informal, for dealing with disagreements between the PR component
parties on key policy issues. I have already pointed out that local
government elections and hudud are two potential flashpoints within the
PR. There is no doubt that other controversial disagreements will emerge
from within the PR coalition. Unlike in the BN, where Umno can dominate
and control major policy directions, the parties within the PR
coalition are much more equal in terms of stature and also control of
Parliament and state seats. Even though the prime minister from PR, most
likely Anwar Ibrahim, will yield considerable power, it would be
difficult for him to ride roughshod over his component party members in
the same way as Dr Mahathir Mohamad within the BN context.
The PR supreme council needs to be strengthened and proper procedures
identified in order to solve conflicts emerging from within PR on
issues of national and sub-national importance.
Conclusion
This article has barely scratched the surface of what a PR government
may look like and the main challenges which it will face as a new
ruling coalition. But hopefully, it has been helpful in outlining the
major issues of contention and providing some guidelines as to how these
challenges may be addresses so that PR can effectively deliver positive
change to the country. — New Mandala
* Ong Kian Ming holds a PhD in political science from Duke
University. He is the project director of the Malaysian Electoral Roll
Analysis Project (Merap), political analyst and a lecturer at the
University College Sedaya International (UCSI). He can be reached at
im.ok.man(at)gmail.com
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